Elvire Fabry is Director of the Trade and Economic Security programme at the Jacques Delors Institute.
Interview by Jean-Claude Galli
OASE: At its closing, the recent G7 summit in Évian drew widespread praise. Was this an unexpected, not to say unhoped-for, moment of multilateralism in a period marked by a general retreat into national interests?
Elvire Fabry: Rather than multilateralism, we can speak of plurilateralism, but the format was complicated, much like last year's G7 under the Canadian presidency. It was legitimate to question what could realistically be achieved with Donald Trump around the table. Compared with 2025, new sensitive issues were added to already difficult ones: the US disengagement from Europe, the increase in tariffs and the financing of support for Ukraine. These included, in particular, Greenland and Iran, alongside Donald Trump's repeated criticism of the lack of engagement from other partners, especially Europeans.
Drawing on analyses by IMF economists and a broader group of experts, Emmanuel Macron sought to build cohesion around a shared diagnosis of the macroeconomic imbalances caused by China. Beijing continues to invest heavily in innovation, R&D and manufacturing by subsidising its companies, at the expense of support for domestic consumption. A China that could account for 45% of global manufacturing by 2030 is not sustainable for the rest of the world, which is increasingly dependent on Chinese innovation. This diagnosis concerns the entire international community, as we are all affected.
OASE: Ahead of this summit, most media attention focused on the trade war with the United States, pushing China-related macroeconomic imbalances into the background. Do you think the Chinese challenge has been underestimated?
E.F.: Absolutely. Donald Trump distracts us from the real structural challenge represented by China, which in fact suits Beijing perfectly. Political attention is captured by the transatlantic confrontation.
This is an issue that affects us deeply in our European identity, because we share values, a military alliance and a long history with the United States. The feeling of betrayal is therefore strong and is not linked solely to Trump. With the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), Joe Biden introduced American preference measures that were discriminatory towards European companies. There should have been, at that time, coordination between the Twenty-Seven and Washington to put pressure on China, but it was another missed opportunity.
We have been accumulating these missed opportunities since the failure of TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or Tafta) negotiations between 2013 and 2016. This transatlantic partnership project was nonetheless highly innovative: it was not simply about lowering tariffs, but about agreeing on mutual recognition of our standards — where they respected the same level of precaution — in order to carry more weight together vis-à-vis China. The objective was therefore, without abandoning our standards, to develop common value chains with the Americans, but the logic of "America First" prevailed.
"Strategic autonomy does not mean opting for autarky by imagining that we can manage on our own"
OASE: US claims over Greenland go beyond this America First logic. It is a surprisingly aggressive geopolitical posture...
E.F.: Greenland was perceived by Europeans as a deeply political, geostrategic and identity-related issue. In a recent debate I attended at Harvard, the confrontation between the Norwegian ambassador to Washington and the former US ambassador to Denmark was striking. The Norwegian ambassador forcefully reminded the Americans that security is a shared responsibility: Russian nuclear threats near Norway are not directed at Northern Europe, but at the United States. America urgently needs European surveillance and partnership, but this confrontation highlighted a glaring imbalance in the perception of the alliance.
OASE: It is often said that Europe risks becoming an industrial vassal of China. Do you share this assessment?
E.F.: The diagnosis is clear, and the report from the High Commission for Planning commissioned by Clément Beaune had the merit of bringing this issue further into the public debate. We have been warning about these challenges for years. The European Commission is not discovering the problem. As early as 2019, at the initiative of the Juncker presidency, it adopted new trade defence instruments. By adopting the triptych "partner, competitor and systemic rival" to describe China, Europe equipped itself with tools to impose fair competition on Beijing within the single market. These tools target reciprocity in public procurement, the control of abusive foreign subsidies and economic coercion.
The real problem lies in national capitals, where the debate on the Chinese challenge remains too lukewarm. Our parliamentarians rarely take it up, even though it is a crucial issue for the global economy. By contrast, the French report mentioned earlier proposes a conclusion that is rather disconnected from reality: imposing a uniform 30% tax on all Chinese imports. This is an unworkable measure.
Donald Trump tried this and had to multiply exemptions to avoid massive inflation on everyday consumer goods. Pure protectionism is not the solution, because our strategic dependencies and our needs for raw materials are very real. Strategic autonomy does not mean opting for autarky by imagining that we can manage on our own.
"We will not be able to withstand the combined pressure from the American, Chinese and Russian blocs without a genuine leap in European political integration"
OASE: How can this strategic autonomy be achieved without falling into the trap of protectionism?
E.F.: At the macroeconomic level, the European Union's economic security strategy is based on three essential pillars, the "3 Ps": Promote — developing our internal industrial capabilities; Protect — using our trade defence instruments; and Partner — strengthening our alliances with trusted partners.
Recent emphasis has been placed on international partnerships and trade defence. But on the industrial front, much more effort is needed in investment directed towards innovation. Europe has colossal private savings of nearly €33tn, but these savings remain passive or flow towards the United States. To mobilise them, the Capital Markets Union — or "Savings and Investment Union", as promoted by the reports of Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi — is indispensable. This requires harmonising our financial rules and centralising supervision, but also bringing about a real change in mindset, shifting from a culture of savings to a culture of strategic investment.
OASE: What is the risk for the EU if we fail to make this strategic shift?
E.F.: The risk is a rapid erosion of our influence, including in countries of the Global South. While Western attention is absorbed by Donald Trump's statements, Beijing is methodically deploying its long-term strategy. After building the physical infrastructure of the New Silk Roads, China has since 2023 redirected its efforts towards green technologies, digital technologies, artificial intelligence and the pharmaceutical industry, where it is becoming extremely innovative. If Europe is not present to offer credible alternatives in these regions, China will occupy the entire space.
OASE: What do you see as the priority levers for action?
E.F.: We must urgently accelerate political coordination between Member States and move beyond purely national reflexes. This is clearly visible in the defence industry, with projects such as FCAS, where tensions around technology transfers are slowing our progress.
We will not be able to withstand the combined pressure from the American, Chinese and Russian blocs without a genuine leap in European political integration. Such a leap requires, in particular, a deepening of the single market, enabling the competitiveness of our companies to be strengthened. We do not have time to amend the treaties. This will happen through plurilateralism and "coalitions of the willing" within the EU. Those who want to move forward, for example on the Savings and Investment Union, must do so without seeking unanimity.
The fragmentation of Europe is actively desired by its rivals, whether Vladimir Putin or Donald Trump. Europe must finally choose unity, the diversification of its supplies and operational resilience.